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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) COMBINED INSPECTION PROTOCOL AND
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-008.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 2, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.

Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the combined Inspection Protocol (IP) Working Group and Conversion or Elimination (CoreE) Working Group meeting chaired by Dr. Warner, Mr. Elliott, Colonel Ilin, and Colonel Ryzhkov, the sides discussed the issues that needed to be resolved concerning elimination inspections. The discussion focused primarily on reaching agreement regarding the conduct of Type-2 elimination inspections. The U.S. side utilized a chart to describe the basic process and problems or loopholes associated with conducting elimination inspections for eliminated ICBM silo launchers and individually converted SLBM launchers on SSBNs. The Russian side agreed that the U.S. side raised valid issues and said they were prepared to develop solutions for these matters.

[1](#)4. (S) The Russian side proposed allowing the inspection of no more than 50 percent of the total eliminated solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM motors in a given year. The U.S. side countered that an agreement had been reached in Moscow during the meeting between General Makarov and Admiral Mullen that the inspecting side would have the opportunity to inspect up to 100 percent of the solid-fueled rocket motors and mobile launchers of ICBMs eliminated in a given year. Ryzhkov asserted that no such agreement was made and argued that only 50 percent of the items eliminated would be

made available for inspection. The Russian side shared their reasoning in detail. Both sides agreed to study the issue and address it again during the next IPWG meeting. End summary.

15. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Which Type?; Text Changes; How Many is Enough?.

WHICH TYPE?

16. (S) Ilin stated the Heads of Delegation had agreed that batch inspections for solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs eliminated by methods other than explosion, in addition to eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, would be accomplished as Type-2 inspections. He noted this required the concentration of eliminated missile first stages at one location and asked what would be considered a sufficiently significant concentration and how notifications of such concentrations should occur.

17. (S) Warner responded that using a Type-2 inspection for all

elimination inspections would change the fundamental understanding of where such inspections could occur. In the wake of eliminations of ICBM silo launchers or the conversion of individual SLBM launchers on an SSBN, such inspections would be conducted at silo-based ICBM bases and submarine bases. Following the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBM and mobile launchers of ICBMs, the Type-2 inspections would be conducted at designated Core facilities. Warner also noted an alternative for the inspection of the elimination of silo launchers and the conversion of SLBM launchers would be to conduct such inspections in conjunction with a Type-1 inspection. After some discussion, Ilin and Warner indicated they preferred to use Type-2 inspections to confirm the results of elimination rather than appending them to Type-1 inspections.

TEXT CHANGES

18. (S) Warner noted that changes would be required in Section VII of Part Five of the protocol. He proposed adding a new subsection in this section that would set forth the right to confirm the results of the elimination using a Type-2 inspection and provide specific provisions regarding the general approach for conducting these inspections. It would be linked to Part Three (Conversion or Elimination) and Part Four (Notifications) of the Protocol, and appropriate additions would need to be made in the Annex to provide the detailed procedures for these inspections. Warner noted this could be treated as a scheduled inspection that would be different than a standard, short-notice, Type-2 inspection. The eliminating party would provide a window for inspection and the inspecting party would notify their intention to inspect. He said some matters such as which side bears the cost for the inspection, the duration of these inspections, and the number of inspectors involved would likely be the same as other Type-2 inspections and thus covered in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. Batch accumulation details should probably be covered in Part Three, but it is an issue for our collective discussion, he said.

¶9. (S) Ilin responded that merging this new inspection into existing text was the better way to incorporate the new concept. He suggested that the General Provisions section could be used to provide details of batch-specific portions of this inspection. All other details would be covered text in Part Five. He opined that the U.S. approach would require a separate section for all possible Type-2 inspections. Warner replied that there would likely be some combination of both approaches.

HOW MANY IS ENOUGH?

¶10. (S) Ilin explained the "basics" of the Russian proposal. First, he noted that to ensure reliability of these inspections, the concentration of a certain percentage of annual eliminated missiles would be needed. He then proposed 50 percent be used as this percentage, which would be split roughly equally between two batches each year. Therefore, if the inspecting Party conducted these two inspections, confirmation of the elimination results for at least 50 percent of the eliminated missiles for that year would be achieved. Ilin indicated there would be no additional

inspection opportunities in a given year beyond the chance to inspect the two 25 percent batches. He stated the same approach would be applied for the inspection of the eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs and that the limit of no more than two Type-2 inspections per year for each CorE facility would apply.

¶11. (S) Warner replied that determining the percentage of the annual output of eliminated items to be inspected would be the most difficult aspect of this topic. He noted that, in the U.S. view, the Russian side had agreed in Moscow to provide the opportunity to inspect 100 percent of the eliminated solid-fueled missiles that were eliminated by means other than explosion. Ryzhkov replied that was incorrect and that the Russian side had made no such agreement. Ilin reiterated that the absolute number of eliminated missiles or mobile launchers of ICBMs would vary year to year since it would depend on the total number eliminated during that year, but it would involve no more than 50 percent of the annual output of eliminated missiles.

¶12. (S) Ryzhkov and Smirnov then attempted to explain why it would not be possible to batch 100 percent of the eliminated items in a given year. They indicated that a limited number of missiles could be processed at Votkinsk at any given time. Storage of too many eliminated motor casings to support batch inspections could cause "traffic jams" due to space limitations. These traffic jams would cause the Russian side to fail to meet the quota set forth in their annual plan for elimination.

¶13. (S) Warner requested additional clarification regarding the Russian proposed elimination inspection approach. Smirnov briefly described the Russian solid-fueled missile elimination process, and it was agreed that some overlap in display of eliminated motor casings for observation by National Technical Means (NTM) would likely occur. The actual time of overlap could not be accurately predicted. It was noted that perhaps the 30-day inspection window set forth in Part Three of the Protocol would have to be extended for some items. That time extension would allow for overlap of eliminated missiles on display and allow for observation of unplanned mini-batches of eliminated items by NTM and by inspectors. Some details remained unanswered, but both sides

agreed to discuss these issues during the next IPWG meeting.

¶14. (S) Warner asked if the duration of such Type-2 elimination inspections should be discussed. Ilin replied that the allowable duration should be sufficient to provide for confirmation of numbers and types of items eliminated in addition to reading the unique identifiers on the eliminated missiles, but that it would depend on the number of items. He also stated that he was flexible in allowing enough time to complete the activities required during the inspection. Ilin inquired what would occur in the case of elimination by explosion, and Warner replied batch inspections would not be applicable since nothing would remain to be inspected after the explosion. Ilin noted that only notifications paperwork had been seen with regard to U.S. solid-fueled missile eliminations in the past.

¶15. (S) Ilin raised concerns regarding parity in missile elimination inspections several times during the meeting. He noted the U.S. side had not provided a list of conversion or elimination facilities for its solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs while the Russian side had and that batch elimination inspections would only apply to the Russian side.

¶16. (U) Documents provided:

- United States:

-- Chart slide, "Conversion or Elimination Inspections As Type Two Inspections," dated February 2, 2010.

¶17. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner

Mr. Elliott

Mr. Brown

Mr. Buttrick

Lt Col Goodman

LTC Leyde

LTC Litterini

Mr. Rust

LT Sicks (RO)

Mr. Smith

Mr. Taylor

Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov

Ms. Vodolopova

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

118. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS